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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Ronald Ray Henry appeals from the summary dismissal of his second
successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
According to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Henry was charged with rape,
burglary, grand theft, and false imprisonment based upon the following facts:
Henry and the victim met in a bar on the evening in question
and consumed alcoholic drinks together.
The two left the
establishment together and rode in the victim's car, with Henry
driving, to a garage that contained a trailer where Henry was
residing. According to the victim, Henry then physically accosted
her, struck her in the face when she resisted, and raped her. The
victim escaped and ran to a nearby hotel wearing only sweatpants,
and the police were summoned. The police located the victim's
other articles of clothing in the garage. The victim told police that
her rapist had a tattoo on his arm or neck that read "Compton."
The victim's car was missing from the scene and, two days later,
Henry was apprehended by Montana authorities while driving it.
Evidence at trial established that Henry has a "Compton" tattoo on
his arm. Photographs admitted at trial showed injuries to the
victim's face, and a medical examination found sperm in her body.
State v. Henry, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 326, Docket No. 33116, pp.1-2
(Idaho App. Jan. 17, 2008) (hereinafter "Slip Op.").
Henry of all the charges.

~

At trial, a jury convicted

The district court sentenced Henry to twenty-five

years with six and one-half years fixed for rape, six years with one and one-half
years fixed for burglary, six years with one and one-half years fixed for grand

1

theft, and one year of local jail for false imprisonment. (#39775 R., pp.1, 14, 1920, 23, 27.) 1
On appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Henry presented two issues,
challenging only his rape conviction:

(1) whether the district court erred by

allowing a detective to testify that substances other than alcohol could have
caused the victim's symptoms of intoxication (but precluding testimony about
what specific type of drug might have been involved)2; and (2) prosecutorial
misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error by arguing during closing
argument, without any support, that Henry had given the victim a date rape drug.
Slip Op. at p.3.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Henry's judgment of

conviction for rape, concluding the district court did not err in its evidentiary ruling
regarding the detective's testimony, and that Henry failed to demonstrate the
prosecutor's closing argument constituted fundamental error, or, alternatively,
that the prosecutor's argument was not harmless. See generally Slip Op.
Following his direct appeal, Henry filed a post-conviction petition, which,
after being amended twice, presented three basic claims, 3 described by the
district court as:

On August 26, 2014, this Court entered an Order Taking Judicial Notice, in
which it took judicial notice of the "Court file, Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 39775, Henry v. State." (#41847 R., p.26.)
1

Both the district court and the Idaho Court of Appeals deemed the detective's
testimony relevant to showing the cause of the victim's intoxication in light of the
victim's testimony that she was "more intoxicated than she had been on past
occasions when consuming a like amount of alcohol." Slip Op. at pp.2-3.
2

3

Henry's initial post-conviction petition included four general claims, including
the three claims that were finally presented. (#39775 R., p.2.) Henry also initially
2

1)
that the judgment and sentence are in violation of the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho; 2) that
the prosecutor's misconduct resulted in a violation of due process;
and 3) that the conviction is subject to collateral attack on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of pre-trial counsel, trial counsel,
and post-trial counsel.
(#39775 R., p.29; see #39775 R., pp.1-9, 13-18, 22-25.) Additionally, Henry filed
an affidavit asserting a variety of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
(Attachment to Succ. Pet., 7/12/10 Aff. of Ronald Henry.) 4
After the state filed a motion for summary dismissal, the court held a
hearing on that motion.

(#39775 R., pp.29-34.)

During the hearing, Henry's

counsel attempted to clarify the nature of Henry's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.

First, counsel explained, "it's our position that the ineffective

assistance of counsel acted in concert with the prosecutorial misconduct to
prejudice Mr. Henry in this case" by trial counsel's alleged failure to object to
prosecutorial misconduct in questioning witnesses and closing argument.
(#39775, 1/13/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-24.)

Second, Henry's counsel said he was

relying on the allegations Henry made in his affidavit, dated July 12, 2010,
claiming Henry's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) subpoena the five

specified 40 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, four claims of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, four claims of ineffective
assistance of direct appeal counsel, and eight claims of "judge's errors."
(#39775, pp.5-8.)
On February 9, 2015, this Court granted Respondent's Motion to Augment the
Appellate Record with Henry's successive post-conviction petition (with
attachments). (2/9/15 Order Granting Motion to Augment.) Henry's successive
petition will be cited as "Succ. Pet." On February 13, 2015, the state filed a
Second Motion to Augment the Appellate Record and Statement in Support
Thereof, which, at the time of the filing of this brief, is pending. Documents listed
in that motion will be identified following the designation "Second Augmentation."
4

3

named witnesses for trial (paragraph 5 of the affidavit), (b) cross-examine the
victim about a telephone call she received from her husband (paragraph 6A of
the affidavit), (c) adequately advise Henry about whether he should testify
(paragraph 7 of the affidavit), and (d) object to the prosecutor's alleged
misconduct of referring to the complaining witness as the "victim." 5 (#39775,
1/13/12 Tr., p.7, L.6- p. 9, L.14.)
After a hearing, the district court granted the state's motion for summary
dismissal, concluding Henry's claims failed to present a prima facie case for
relief.

(#39775 R., pp.29-35.)

Although Henry initiated an appeal of the

summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition, he later filed a motion to
voluntarily dismiss that appeal, which this Court granted. (#39775 R., pp.36-39
(Notice of Appeal); 12/31/12 Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal (Court file of
Docket #39775); 1/3/13 "Remittitur" (Court file of Docket #39775 (noting Henry's
Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal was granted on Jan. 2, 2013); see #41847
R., p.26 (8/26/14 Order Taking Judicial Notice of various documents in Supreme

Court No. 39775, including the "Court file").)
On December 12, 2012, Henry filed a successive petition for postconviction relief. (Succ. Pet., p.1.) In his successive petition, Henry raised the
following four general claims:
(a)

Conviction is in violation of the Constitution of the United
States or the State of Idaho.

5

Although Henry's post-conviction counsel stated at the outset of the summary
dismissal motion hearing that he was "pursuing specifically grounds BA and 88"
of the amended petition (#39775, 1/13/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-5), Henry's claim of
ineffective assistance of various counsel is presented in ground SC of the second
Amended Petition (#39775 R., p.24).
4

(b)

There exists evidence of material facts not previously
presented and heard that would require the vacation of the
conviction.

(c)

Ineffective assistance of counsel by all attorneys in all
phases involved.

(d)

[P]rosecutorial misconduct.

(Succ. Pet., p.2.)
In addition to the above-described general claims, Henry presented 34
specific claims of ineffective assistance by his various attorneys.
Pet., pp.4-5.)

(See Succ.

On December 14, 2012, the district court entered an order

dismissing Henry's successive petition, explaining it was not filed in a timely
manner, did not set forth any new grounds, and "is merely a repeat of his original
petition. 116

(Second Augmentation: 12/14/12 Order Dismissing Succ. Pet. For

Post-Conv. Relief.) After Henry filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of his
successive post-conviction petition, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, requiring Henry to file a response within 21
days to show good cause why his appeal should not be dismissed "for failure to
conform to the good faith requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2." (Second
Augmentation: 2/1/13 Order Cond. Dismissing Appeal.) After Henry failed to file
a response, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Order Dismissing Appeal,
followed by a Remittitur.

(Second Augmentation: 5/13/13 Order Dismissing

Appeal; 6/12/13 Remittitur.)

6

The district court further explained, "[t]he second and third pages of the current
petition are not even originals, but merely photographic copies of pages 2 and 3
of his original petition." (Second Augmentation: 12/14/12 Order Dismissing Succ.
Pet. For Post-Conv. Relief.)
5

On October 29, 2013, Henry filed a motion for permission to file a second
successive post-conviction

petition (captioned

"Motion for Leave to

File

Successive Petition and Memorandum in Support"), a supporting affidavit, and a
motion for the appointment of counsel. (Second Augmentation: 10/29/13 Motion
for Leave to File Succ. Petition (etc.); 10/29/13 Affidavit of Ronald Ray Henry;
10/29/13 Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel.)

The

district court construed that motion as a second successive petition for postconviction relief.

(#41847 R., pp.11-12.)

Henry's second successive petition

presented thirteen claims of ineffective assistance by all his previous counsel,
alleging, inter a/ia, in brief summary:
(1)
failure to perform certain duties (e.g., investigate facts,
locate and question potential witnesses, examine the prosecution's
evidence, etc.), resulting in Henry's inability to "present a legitimate
defense;"
(2)
failure to obtain testing on DNA evidence from the rape kit
tested by the state;
(3)
failure to obtain phone records to disprove the victim's
statement that her husband called her at 11 :30 p.m. on the evening
of the incident;
(4)
failure to develop a trial strategy by questioning and
investigating the victim for mental deficiencies and proclivities;
(5)

same as number (1) regarding failure to investigate;

(6)
failure to conduct a rudimentary adversarial challenge to the
prosecutor's version of the facts;
(7)
failure to challenge various abuses of discretion by the court,
including the refusal to provide required jury instructions and
allowing irrelevant and unsubstantiated evidence (claim of a bloody
smudge on a lawn chair pad and suggestions the victim was given
a date rape drug and forced to perform oral sex);

6

(8)

failure to consult with Henry;

(9)

same as number (8)

(10)

no specific claim stated, only legal standards for attorneys;

(11) failure of appellate and post-conviction counsel to present
legitimate issues;
(12) defense counsel made unsuitable comments, denied Henry
his right to testify, and presented an insufficient opening statement
and closing argument;
(13) failure to move for dismissal or directed verdict on the basis
of insufficient evidence.
(Second Augmentation: Motion for Leave to File Succ. Pet. (etc.), pp.7-18.)
Henry also presented six claims of prosecutorial misconduct, essentially alleging
that the prosecutor allowed false testimony to be presented throughout the
state's case, improperly suggested the victim had been given a date rape drug,
and failed to disclose information. (Id., pp.18-23.) Henry lastly claimed that the
cumulative effect of errors rose to the level of fundamental error. (Id. pp.23-25.)
On December 13, 2013, the district court issued a notice of intent to
dismiss, setting forth the grounds on which it intended to dismiss Henry's second
successive petition and giving Henry 20 days to file a response.

(#41847 R.,

pp.11-12). Thecourtexplained:
[Y]our motion for permission to file a successive petition for postconviction relief (treated here as a petition for post-conviction relief)
will be dismissed for the reason that you have not alleged any new
grounds for relief, or presented any admissible evidence to support
any new grounds for relief. The grounds for relief you alleged were
either included in your prior appeal of your criminal conviction,
included in your prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief, or could
have been included in your appeal of your criminal conviction or
prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief.

7

As an additional ground, you have not supported your
allegations with any admissible evidence.
(#41847 R., p.11.) That same day, the court entered "Findings Regarding Motion
for Appointment of Counsel on Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,"
denying Henry's request for appointed counsel. (#41847 R., pp.13-15.)
After Henry failed to file a response the court's notice of intent to dismiss, 7
the court entered an order of dismissal and a judgment. (#41847 R., pp.16-17,
21-22.) Henry filed a "Petition for Reconsideration Pursuant to Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure Rules 12 and 41," seeking reconsideration of both the summary
dismissal of Henry's petition and the denial of Henry's motion for appointed
counsel.

(Second Augmentation: 1/2/14 Petition for Reconsideration (etc.).)

Four days later, the court issued an "Order Denying Motion to Reconsider." 8
(#41847 R., pp.18-19.) Henry filed a timely notice of appeal. (#41847 R., pp.2736.)

According to the Register of Actions, the only pleading filed by Henry during
the 20-day period he was given to respond to the court's notice of intent to
dismiss occurred on January 2, 2014, when Henry filed a Petition for
Reconsideration. (#41847 R., p.9.) That Petition for Reconsideration was
apparently filed in regard to the denial of Henry's motion for appointed counsel
inasmuch as four days after that petition was filed, the court entered an order
denying Henry's "Motion to Reconsider the court's denial of his earlier motion to
appoint counsel." (#41847 R., p.18 (emphasis added).)
7

8

The district court's Order Denying Motion to Reconsider stated, "The
petitioner's Motion to Reconsider the court's denial of his earlier motion to
appoint counsel is denied." (#41847 R., p.18.) Inasmuch as Henry's "Petition for
Reconsideration" requested reconsideration of both the summary dismissal of his
second successive petition and his motion for appointed counsel, it appears that
the court's order denying reconsideration intended to deny reconsideration of
both orders.

8

ISSUES
Henry's statement of issues on appeal is too lengthy to repeat in its
entirety. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.2-4 (identifying 20 issues).)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Henry failed to show error in the dismissal of his second
successive post-conviction petition and denial of his motion for reconsideration?
2.
Has Henry failed to show error in the denial of his request for the
appointment of counsel?

9

ARGUMENT
I.
Henry Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of His Second Successive
Post-Conviction Petition And Denial Of His Motion For Reconsideration
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Henry's second successive petition because

(1) he failed to allege "any new grounds for relief," (2) the grounds for relief either
were, or could have been, included in Henry's direct appeal or prior postconviction petition(s), and (3) he failed to support his "allegations with any
admissible evidence." (#41847 R., p.11.) Henry fails to demonstrate error by the
district court in summarily dismissing his second successive petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).
The decision of a trial court to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Lea
Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008); Straub v. Smith,
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145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,
592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001 ).

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Henry's Second Successive
Petition And Denied His Motion To Reconsider
On appeal, Henry asserts that his failure to raise issues contained within

his second successive post-conviction petition "was strictly due to the material
and controlling factor(s) that -- all previously appointed counsel failed to litigate
any of those issues which are now brought before either the district court, or this
court." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Henry cites Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,
635 P.2d 955 (1981), in support of his argument that the alleged ineffective
assistance of his prior post-conviction counsel constitutes "sufficient reason(s)"
for permitting him to file a second successive post-conviction petition. See I.C. §
19-4908. 9 Henry's arguments fail because (1) as the district court concluded, the
claims in his second successive petition were, or could have been, previously
presented, and (2) the Palmer basis for showing a "sufficient reason" to avoid the
I.C. § 19-4908 bar to successive petitions is no longer valid law.

9

Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides:

Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for
relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application,
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in
the original, supplemental, or amended application.

11

The district court correctly concluded that, because the claims in Henry's
second successive petition were previously presented, or could have been
presented, in either his direct appeal or his initial post-conviction proceeding, he
was barred from presenting those claims in a second successive petition. I.C. §
19-4908. Although the court did not specifically cite I.C. § 19-4908 in its Order
Denying Motion and Notice of Intent to Dismiss, that Order was plainly based on
that statue, stating:
Notice is hereby given to the petitioner that your motion for
permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief
(treated here as a petition for post-conviction relief) will be
dismissed for the reason that you have not alleged any new
grounds for relief, or presented any admissible evidence to support
any new grounds for relief. The grounds for relief you alleged were
either included in your prior appeal of your criminal conviction,
included in your prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief, or could
have been included in your appeal of your criminal conviction or
prior petition(s) for post-conviction relief.
(#41847 R., p.11.)

On appeal, Henry does not contest the district court's

conclusion that he either presented his second successive claims previously, or
could have done so, stating:
[Henry] asserts that the reason(s) he failed to raise the
issues contained within his "second or successive post-conviction
application" and "memorandum of law in support of post-conviction
relief' was strictly due to the material and controlling factor(s) that -all previously appointed counsel failed to litigate any of those issues
which are now brought before either the district court, or this court.
From [direct appeal] to all previous [post-conviction
applications], the appellant suffered the inapt [sic] representation(s)
from appointed counsel by the district court and not one single
educated attorney has ever litigated the contained constitutional
issues/violations which the appellant has strived to litigate before
any court of law.
(Appellant's Brief, p.5 (capitalization modified; bracketed comments original).)

12

In short, Henry does not take issue with the district court's finding that the
claims in his second successive petition were either presented previously, or
could have been presented in a prior proceeding.

Instead, Henry alleges his

prior post-conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
adequately present his claims, citing Palmer as the basis for skirting the
successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908. (Id., p.6.)
However, the Palmer exception to the statutory bar to successive petitions
has been overruled by Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 391, 327 P .3d 365, 367
(2014), in which the Supreme Court succinctly said:

"We hold that that [sic]

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under
I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition, and thus, overrule Palmer v.

Dermitt."

Because ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a

sufficient reason for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908,
Henry has failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his successive
post-conviction petition or its denial of his motion to reconsider.

11.
Henry Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Counsel
A.

Introduction
Henry contends the district court erred in denying his request for counsel,

asserting he "raised sufficient claims before the district court" to justify the
appointment of counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.37.) Review of the record and the
applicable legal standards shows the district court correctly concluded Henry was

13

not entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent him on an improper
second successive petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327
P.3d 365, 369 (2014).

C.

Henry Was Not Entitled To Counsel To Represent Him On His Second
Successive Petition
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the
UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who
is unable to pay the costs of representation." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327
P.3d at 369 (quoting I.C. § 19-4904; citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)).

"The standard for determining whether to

appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is
whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim."
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). "In deciding whether the prose petition
raises the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should consider whether the
facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be
willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims."
Swaderv. State, 143 Idaho 651,654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007). The appointment
of counsel is not appropriate for the purpose of searching the record for

14

potentially nonfrivolous claims; rather, the petition itself must allege the facts that
raise the possibility of a valid claim before the appointment of counsel is
warranted. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (citing Swader, 143 Idaho
at 654, 152 P.3d at 15).
The district court cited the foregoing standards and denied Henry's
request for counsel because Henry failed to show a sufficient reason for pursuing
a successive petition as required by I.C. § 19-4908 and, as such, there was no
possibly valid claim entitling Henry to counsel. (#41847 R., pp.13-15.) Although
Henry believes otherwise (Appellant's Brief, p.37), as discussed in the preceding
argument, the record supports the district court's conclusion. See Murphy, 156
Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (finding no error in failing to appoint counsel to
represent petitioner on an improper successive petition).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's
dismissal of Henry's second successive petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2015.

~~
(jl)
JOHN . McKINNEY
Dep
Attorney General
1

~
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